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In this paper, the new empirical industrial organization approach with a dynamic model is 
simultaneously employed to measure the degree of oligopoly, oligopsony power, and cost 
efficiency in the U.S. beef packing industry. The oligopsony power is estimated with two 
effects: cash cattle procurement market power and captive supply market power. The model 
is estimated by the Generalized Method of Moments using monthly data from 1990 to 2006. 
The empirical results reveal the presence of market power in both the beef retail market and 
the cattle procurement market in the sample period. The captive supply is a source of 
oligopsony market power, but the effect is considerably small. The oligopsony market 
power is greater and less stable than oligopoly market power for the whole sample period. 
The cost efficiency effect outweighs the market power effects for the sample period. 
 
Keywords: beef packing industry, captive supply, cost efficiency, industrial concentration, 
market power, NEIO 
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Dynamic Assessment of Oligopoly, Oligopsony Power, and Cost Efficiency using  
the New Empirical Industrial Organization in the U.S. Beef Packing Industry 
Introduction 
Several issues are concerned with market power in the U.S. beef packing industry. Among 
these market power issues, concentration and captive supply
1 are the most controversial 
issues. A wave of mergers and consolidations in the beef packing industry began in the late 
1970’s and continued until the early 1990’s (Azzam 1997). Especially during the recent 
decades, the concentration of the beef packing industry has gradually increased. The four-
firm concentration ratio in terms of boxed beef supply increased from 52.9 percent in 1980 
to 84.7 percent in 2000, while the ratio in terms of cattle slaughter increased from 28.4 
percent in 1980 to 71.2 percent in 2003. As a form of backward integration by packers, the 
captive supply has also continuously increased over the last two decades. The captive 
supply ratio as a total cattle slaughter also continuously increased from 20.5 percent in 
1988 to 44.4 percent in 2002 (USDA). With horizontal merger and concentration, it is 
unclear whether cost efficiency gains from increased concentration outweigh potential 
market power effects. It is also disputable whether captive supply increases efficiency of 
reducing transaction costs and market risk or it reduces competition and increase the market 
power of packers.  
After Schroeter (1988) introduced the new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) 
in agricultural economics, many studies have measured market power. These NEIO 
                                                 
1  The definition of captive supply by USDA Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration 
(GIPSA) includes animals procured through forward contracts, marketing agreements, and packer feeding 
arrangements or otherwise committed to a packer more than 14 days prior to slaughter. 2 
 
approaches in agricultural economics are well reviewed by several researchers such as 
Sexton (2000), Sheldon and Sperling (2002), and Whitley (2003). Among the articles that 
use NEIO approaches, several studies try to compare market power and cost efficiency. 
Most industrial organization literature suggests that a merger’s efficiency gain offsets 
consumers’ potential welfare losses (Azzam and Schroeter 1995; Azzam 1997; Sexton 
2000; Tostao and Chung 2005). However, Lopez, Azzam, and Espana (2002) find that 
market power effects dominate cost efficiency effects in most food industries, and that 
further increases in concentration would increase output price. Numerous studies are 
concerned with captive supply. These studies focus on the relationship between the captive 
supply and cash market price to investigate the effect of captive supply on the beef 
procurement market. Many studies report a negative relationship between captive supply 
and cash market price (Ward, Koontz, and Schroeder 1998; Schroeter and Azzam 2004). 
Also most researchers believe that this negative relationship reflects market power of the 
packer as a buyer that uses the captive supply to press cash market price in the cattle 
procurement market (Schroeder et. al. 1993; Ward, Koontz, and Schroeder 1998; Zhang 
and Sexton 2000). These studies focus on dealing with the relationship between captive 
supply and cash market price rather than looking into the effect of captive supply in the 
industrial level. 
The previous studies have some limitations. First, most studies assume that the 
processing firms have oligopsony power in the cattle procurement market (Azzam and 
Schroeter 1995; Azzam 1997), while others assume the wholesalers have oligopoly power 
in the beef market (Lopez, Azzam, and Espana 2002). Allowing for market power in 3 
 
procuring firm inputs while ignoring the potential market power in selling final outputs is 
likely to understate market power effects or vice versa
2 (Tostao and Chung 2005). 
Additionally, Only one study deals with the captive supply in the NEIO model (Zheng and 
Vukina 2009). However, this study focuses only on the captive supply market power for the 
average firm rather than dealing with both the captive supply and the concentration for the 
industrial level in the pork packing industry. Therefore, in this study, the oligopoly and 
oligopsony market powers are simultaneously considered, and the oligopsony market 
power is separated by two effects: cash cattle procurement market effect and captive supply 
effect. Finally, the concentration change is considered in the NEIO model. That is, we 
extend Zheng and Vukina (2009)’s model to a more general model that includes 
concentration effect in the NEIO model.  
Second, conjectural variations such as market conduct parameters are prominent 
components in the NEIO approach. Conjectural variations measure the overall market 
reaction to an individual firm’s change in output supply and input demand. However, these 
previous studies assume that the conjectural variation is constant throughout the sample 
period. Therefore, they are limited in explaining how market power and efficiency change 
with evolving industry structure over time. 
The objective of this paper is threefold. First, the effect of cost efficiency and 
market power by increasing concentration in the U.S. beef packing industry is measured 
considering market power exerted through both oligopoly and oligopsony simultaneously. 
                                                 
2  Ignoring this important variable can induce omitted variable problems. If the omitted variable is 
uncorrelated with right-hand side variables then the estimate will only lose all efficiency properties, but if the 
omitted variable is correlated with right-hand side variables then the estimate will lose all properties so that 
the estimate is biased and inconsistent. (Greene 2008). 4 
 
Second, the oligopsony market power for captive supply is separately estimated from the 
cash cattle procurement market in the NEIO model. Third, the changes of market powers 
and efficiencies in the beef retail and cattle procurement market are measured for the U.S. 
beef packing industry during the 1990-2006 time period using monthly data. This paper 
extends the existing literature of market power related to the U.S. beef packing industry by 
including captive supply market power and by examining the dynamic oligopoly and 
oligopsony powers jointly over the past several decades. The results of this paper will be 
helpful to understand the structure and change of market power behavior in the U.S. beef 
packing industry. 
The Model 
Generally, two approaches exist in the theoretical framework of conjectural elasticity 
(Wann and Sexton 1992; Mei and Sun 2008). One is the primal production function-based 
approach (Azzam and Pagoulatos 1990; Mei and Sun 2008) and the other is the dual 
approach based on a cost function (Schroeter 1988; Azzam 1997; Lopez, Azzam, and 
Espana 2002; Tostao and Chung 2005). In this paper, we use the dual approach because of 
an absence of quantity data for the output and input at the firm level. 
In view of the intended application, we assume beef processors and retailers are 
integrated in a single “processing-retailing” sector that is allowed to have oligopoly and 
oligopsony market power simultaneously (Tostao and Chung 2005). We assume a beef 
processing-retailing industry consisting of  N  firms converting a single farm input, cattle, 
into a final output, beef. We assume two procurement channels: the cash market and the 5 
 
captive supply and that the captive supply for each period is given because the captive 
supply is determined before the packer decides the amount of cattle procured from the cash 
market. Therefore, the firms determine the cattle procured from the cash market to 
maximize the firm’s profit. We assume each farmer is faced with a competitive market to 
sell cattle to packers. Each firm’s processing technology is characterized by fixed 
proportions between the farm input and the output (Schroeter 1988; Azzam 1997). 
Conversion of the farm input into output requires non-farm inputs that are purchased in 
competitive markets and used in variable proportions. Each firm sells the homogenous 
output to consumers who buy the output competitively in a market. Therefore, each firm is 
not necessarily a price-taker both in the cattle procurement market and in the beef retail 
market. Profit,  i  , for the ith firm (for  ) , , 2 , 1 N i    is 
(1)                       ) , ( ) ( ) ( ) )( ( 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 v i i i i i i i q C q Q W q Q W q q Q P       , 
where  P  is the beef retail price,  1 W  is the cash market cattle input price,  2 W  is the captive 
supply cattle input price,  i q1  is the ith firm’s beef product or cattle input from the cash 
market,  i q2  is the ith firm’s beef product or cattle input from the captive supply, 
i i i q q q 2 1    is the ith firm’s total beef product or total cattle input,
   
N
i i q Q is the 
industry’s total beef product or the industry’s total cattle input,  ) , ( v i i q C  is the processing 
cost function for the ith firm, and  v is a vector of prices of nonfarm inputs. The first order 
condition for profit maximizing is 





































































Rearranging the first order condition and re-writing it in elasticity form yields 
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i h h i q q 1 1        is the i th firm’s conjecture about rivals’ 
responses to a change in final product sales and in cattle purchases,  ) 1 )( ( Q P Q d      and 
) 1 )( ( 1 1 1 Q W Q s      are the semi-elasticities of retail demand and semi-elasticities of 







   is the change of the captive supply 
price with respect to the change of cash market price,  Q q s i i   is the i th firm’s  market 
share in retail market and cattle procurement market, and  i i i i q q C q c 1 ) , ( ) , (    v v is the 
marginal cost for the ith firm. 
  Following Azzam, the i th firm’s cost function is assumed to take the generalized 
Leontief form: 
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The optimizing condition (3) becomes 
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Multiplying (5) by each firm’s market share,  ) ( Q qi , and summing across all  N firms in 
the industry yields  7 
 
(6)              
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Rearranging equation (6) yields the industry pricing equation as: 
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where   
i i s H
2 ) (  is the Herfindahl index in the retail beef market and in the cattle 
procurement market,
     




1 ) ( ) (   is weighted conjectural variation in the 
retail output market and in the farm input market, and  m e  is the error term for the margin 
equation (Cowling and Waterson 1976; Dickson 1981; Azzam 1997). 
In equation (7), the first three terms in the right-hand side capture market power in 
the beef retail market, in the ash cattle procurement market, and in the captive supply 
respectively in the industrial level. The fourth term captures marginal cost for the integrated 
processing/retailing sector in the industrial level. The value of  1     means there is no 
mark-up or mark-down, that is, all firms are price-takers in the beef retail market and in the 
cattle procurement market, so that the output price or the farm-input price is unchanged. 
The value of  0    implies Cournot monopoly and monopsony. For noncompetitive 
conduct, concentration affects all mark-up, mark-down, and marginal cost. Appelbaum 
(1982) defines conjectural variation elasticity as  H ) 1 (
*     , which ranges between 0 
and 1. The price elasticity of demand for the beef market and the price elasticity of supply 
for the cash cattle market are given by  P E d d    and  1 W E s s    respectively. Then the 8 
 
industry oligopoly power is defined by  d
retail E L
*    , and oligopsony power for the cash 
market and the captive supply are defined by   s
cash E L
*    and s
captive E L
*    
respectively, where  1 2 Q Q    . The value  0
*    denotes perfect competition;  1
*    
denotes pure monopoly or monopsony; and other values denote various degrees of 
oligopoly or oligopsony power with higher values of 
*   denoting greater departures from 
perfect competition (Mei and Sun 2008). 
Market power effects from an increase of concentration in the processing/retailing 
industry can be separated from cost efficiency effects by differentiating equation (7) with 
respect to the Herfindahl index in the processing/retailing industry  ) (H  as: 
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The first three terms in the right-hand side of equation (8) capture market power 
effects in the integrated processing/retailing sector, and the fourth term captures cost 
savings for the integrated processing/retailing sector (Azzam 1997; Lopez, Azzam, and  
Espana 2002).  
To test captive supply effect on market power, the oligopsony market power in 
equation (7) is differentiated with respect to captive supply,  2 Q , and then we obtain  
(9)                                            
1 2












  , 
where  is the captive supply effect on market power. The value of  0    implies that the 
change of captive supply has no impact on the oligopsony market power. 9 
 
The first null hypothesis is that oligopoly market power and two oligopsony market 
powers in the U.S. beef packing industry equal zero. Rejecting it should suggest that the 
U.S. beef packing industry exerts market power in either the beef retail market or the cash 
cattle procurement market, or the captive supply, or all. The second null hypothesis is that 
increasing captive supply has no effect on the oligopsony market power. Rejecting it 
suggests that captive supply is a source of oligopsony market power for packers. The third 
null hypothesis is that by increasing concentration, the cost efficiency effect outweighs 
market power effect. Rejecting it suggests that an increase of concentration in the U.S. beef 
packing industry will decrease social welfare.  
Data 
This paper uses monthly data series for the U.S. beef packing industry ranging from 1990 
to 2006.  The cattle slaughter total live weight, which is used as the total beef production or 
the total cattle input supply is from Livestock Slaughter Annual Summary of United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA). The cash market cattle price data is combined from 
several long-term fed cattle price history (monthly) data sets of the USDA Economic 
Research Service (ERS) which have reported the Nebraska direct fed steer price. The 
weighted captive supply price is combined from the USDA Agricultural Marketing 
Services (AMS) Mandatory Price Report (MPR) data. The retail price of beef, the retail 
price of pork, the wholesale price of chicken, the corn price, and the calf price are from 
USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) and ERS. The fuel oil number 2 
price is obtained from the Consumer Price Index Database of the Bureau of Labor Statistics 10 
 
(BLS). Per capita income data is from the econstats site (http://www.econstats.com). The 
consumer price index for meat and the producer price index for farm product are from BLS. 
The price index and the productivity index of labor for the U.S. animal slaughtering and 
processing industries are obtained from the Industry Productivity and Costs Database of 
BLS. The price index and the productivity index of capital and material for U.S. food and 
other industry are obtained from the Major Sector Multifactor Productivity Index Database 
of BLS. The Herfindahl index for the U.S. beef processing industry is the cattle slaughter 
concentration index (and boxed beef concentration index) compiled from several annual 
reports from the Packers and Stockyards Statistical Report (1996-2006). The four firms 
captive supply ratio is also from the Packers and Stockyards Statistical Report. The 
definitions and descriptive statistics of these variables are presented in table 1. 
Empirical procedures 
To estimate the margin equation (7), simultaneous equations are needed such as three non-
farm input demand equations: the farm input (cattle) supply equation, the retail output (beef) 
demand equation, and the captive supply price equation. Non-farm input demands are 
obtained by applying Shephard’s lemma on the industry level processing cost function 
represented by equation (4) as: 





























which can be re-arranged as: 11 
 




















where  j X  is the industry level derived non-farm input demand,  j v  and  k v  are the input 
price of labor and capital and material, and  j e  is the error term for the non-farm input 
demand function. 
  Cattle supply and beef demand equations take the semi-logarithmic forms which are 
specified as: 
(12)                           s
fuel calves sorghum corn
s e P P P P W Q        4 3 2 1 1 0 1 ln       , 
(13)                           d
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   is the semi-elasticity of 
demand, and  s e  and  d e are the error terms for supply and demand equations respectively.  
  Finally, the captive price can be a function of the cash market price because the 
price of cattle through marketing agreement and forward contract as captive supply is 
calculated by using various formulas that include base price, quality characteristics, and a 
system of premia and discounts. These formulas are tied to cash market price (Schroeter 
and Azzam 2004). The price of captive supply is modeled as: 
 (14)                                            w e Q W W     2 1 1 0 2    , 
where  1 W  is the cash market price,  2 W  is the captive supply price,  2 Q  is the cattle quantity 
procured through the captive supply, and   w e  is the error term for the captive supply 
equation. However, the data for captive supply price is not available before the advent of 12 
 
the mandatory price report, so this equation (14) is separately estimated to find the value, 
, with the monthly data from 2003 to 2007. The result of estimation
3 shows that   is 
0.7229. This value is not much different from Zheng and Vukina (2008)’s value, 0.7835; 
they estimated the similar equation for the pork industry.  
Static Estimation by GMM 
Equations (7), (11), (12), (13), and (14), which constitute a system of seven equations in 
total are estimated. However, we estimate six equations except the equation (14) because 
the data is not available. When estimating the systems, endogeneity problems will occur. 
To deal with endogeneity problems in the simultaneous equations, we employ an 
instrumental variable estimator, generalized method of moments (GMM). Also, GMM is 
used because the Breushch-Godfrey test for autocorrelation (Breusch 1978; Godfrey 1978) 
rejects the null hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation on each equation’s residuals. 
Note that the estimated standard errors for GMM estimates are considerably smaller than 
those for 3SLS or LIML (Green 2008). The nineteen instrumental variables included in the 
equation are the Herfindahl indices for the boxed beef production market and for the cattle 
procurement market, four-firm concentration ratio for cattle procurement market, beef price, 
cattle cash price, cattle price, four-firm captive supply ratio, labor price, capital price, 
material price, corn price, sorghum price, calves price, fuel price, pork price, chicken price, 
income, time, and squared time. 
                                                 
3  In the estimation, we tested the RESET test with linear model specifications with three variables such as 
1 W ,  2 Q , and time . The RESET test shows that the above model is not inappropriate for the power 2, 3, and 
4 at the 5% significance level. Additionally, this model has an autocorrelation problem, so we used GLS to 
estimate the parameters,  ,  0  , and  1  . 13 
 
Dynamic Estimation by GMM 
The above econometric specification can only estimate the static market conduct 
parameters,  . It cannot measure and demonstrate their possible changes over time. We 
treat the equilibrium market conduct parameters as a function of the exogenous variables, 
four-firm concentration ratio, CR , and captive supply ratio,CAPR , as: 
(15)                                    CAPR c CR c c 2 1 0     . 
Then equation (7) can be changed as: 
(16)      
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We can also find equation (17) by differentiating equation (16) with respect to the 
Herfindahl index  ) (H as:   
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. 
This allows the conjectural variation parameter,  , to vary over time, reflecting changes in 
the economic environment
4 (Azzam 1997; Mei and Sun 2008). Equation (17) measures 
concentration effects on output price of the dynamic market conduct, while equation (8) 
measures those of the static market conduct.  
                                                 
4  Azzam (1997) and Lopez, Azzam, and Espana (2002) tried to use time varying models as a function of 
Herfindahl index. However they failed to reject the null hypothesis that the conjecture variation parameter, 
 , is a constant. Mei and Sun (2008) modeled time varying model as a function of four-firm concentration 
ratio and average mill capacity. Schroeter (1988) also modeled as a function of labor input price, capital input 
price, and time trend for time varying model. 14 
 
Equations (16), (11), (12), and (13), which constitute a system, are estimated for 
dynamic model. The dynamic market conduct parameter, 
*  ,  and market power 
retail L , 
cash L , and
captive L  can be estimated using the estimated values of  i c , four-firm concentration 
ratio, captive supply ratio, and estimated supply and demand elasticities. The concentration 
effects on the output price of the dynamic market conduct and their standard error are also 
estimated through GMM using the MODEL Procedure in SAS 9.1. 
Empirical Results 
The estimation results of the static model by GMM are reported in table 2.  By t-statistics, 
20 of the 21 parameter estimates are statistically significant at the 5% significance level. 
For the key parameters, conjectural variation,  , is -0.6838 and statistically significant at 
the 5% significance level. The conjectural variation is tested for pure monopoly or pure 
monopsony,  0   , and for perfect competition,  1    . Both null hypotheses are rejected 
at the 5% significance level. So we can conclude that oligopoly and oligopsony conducts 
exist in the U.S. beef packing industry. The semi-elasticities of supply and demand are 
0.0069 and -0.0020, respectively. They are also statistically significant at the 5% 
significance level. Based on these results, the conjectural elasticities, 
*  , oligopoly market 
power, 
retail L , oligopsony market power for cash market,
cash L , and oligopoly market power 
for captive supply, 
captive L , are calculated in table 3. The conjectural elasticity is 0.0440, the 
oligopoly market power, 
retail L , is 0.1041, the oligopsony market power for cash market,
cash L ,  is 0.946, and the oligopsony market power for captive supply, 
captive L , is 0.0294. 
They are all significant at the 5% significance level. These results imply that market power 15 
 
exists in both the beef retail and cattle procurement markets. The oligopsony market power 
for captive supply is considerably smaller compare to the oligopsony market power for cash 
market, but the oligopsony power is slightly larger than the oligopoly power. This result 
coincides with the findings of Tostao and Chung (2005). 
  In contrast to the static estimation, the dynamic model allows conjectural elasticity 
and market powers to change over time. In the dynamic model, we assume conjectural 
elasticity is a function of four-firm concentration and captive supply ratio, so we can 
calculate the conjectural elasticity and market powers for each year. The parameter 
estimates and the statistics for the model are reported in table 5. The magnitude of 
parameter estimates and overall fit are comparable to those from the static GMM estimation. 
The dynamic conjectural elasticity and market powers from 1990 to 2006 are presented in 
table 6. They are all statistically significant at the 5% significance level. The oligopoly 
power is still slightly smaller than the oligopsony power. The oligopoly and oligopsony 
market powers are gradually decreasing with time after 1990, which is not consistent with 
the change of the concentrate rates (Herfindahl indices) in both the beef retail and cattle 
cash procurement market, but the oligopsony market power for captive supply gradually 
increases with the increase of captive supply. Over 1990-2006, the maximum value of 
oligopoly market power is 0.1131 in 1990, the minimum is 0.0658 in 2004, and the average 
is 0.0906, but the maximum value of oligopsony power is 0.1266 in 1990, the minimum is 
0.0869 in 2003, and the average is 0.1119. The results show that oligopsony power is 
slightly larger and less stable than oligopoly power. 16 
 
The effect of captive supply on market power,  0   , is tested. The value of   is 
0.0276 in the static model, and 0.0249 in the dynamic model, and both of them are 
statistically significant at the 5% significance level. This result means that by increasing 
captive supply, the oligopsony market power expands. 
  In the static and dynamic model, the marginal effects of market concentration on 
market powers and cost efficiency are calculated by equations (8) and (17) in table 4 and 
table 7. The oligopoly effect, the oligopsony effect for cash market and captive supply, the 
cost efficiency effect, and the total net effect are 155.68, 45.91, 14.27, -446.98, and -231.12 
respectively in the static model. They are all statistically significant at the 5% significance 
level. For the dynamic model, the oligopoly effect, the oligopsony effect for cash market 
and captive supply, the cost efficiency effect, and the total net effect are calculated for each 
year. The average values are 135.57, 41.26, 12.81, -199.54, and -9.88 respectively. They 
are also statistically significant at the 5% significance level. These results imply a mark-up 
effect on the beef price by increasing concentration in both oligopoly and oligopsony 
markets while cost efficiency also exists by increasing concentration. The cost efficiency 
effect dominates the market power effects in both the static and dynamic model but is 
significantly smaller in the dynamic model. This result is consistent with the findings of 
Azzam and Schroeter (1995), Azzam (1997), Sexton (2000), and Tostao and Chung (2005) 
but contradict those of Lopez, Azzam, and Espana (2002).  
In summary, the null hypotheses that the oligopoly market power and oligopsony 
market power in the U.S. beef packing industry equal zero are rejected in the static and 
dynamic model. Therefore, we can conclude that the U.S. beef packing industry exerts 17 
 
market power in both the beef retail market and the cattle procurement market but the 
oligopsony market power is slightly larger than the oligopoly market power. The second 
null hypothesis that captive supply has no effect on oligopsony market power is rejected. 
This conclusion implies that packers use captive supply as a source of market power, but 
the market power from captive supply is small. The third null hypothesis that by increasing 
concentration the cost efficiency effect outweighs market power effects fails to reject in 
both the static and dynamic models. So, we can conclude that an increase of concentration 
in the U.S. beef packing industry increases social welfare. 
Conclusions 
During the last two decades, concentration and captive supply have been controversial 
issues as sources of market power in the U.S. beef packing industry. This paper contributes 
two fold to the measurement of market power in the U.S. beef packing industry. First, the 
oligopoly and oligopsony market powers are simultaneously considered, and the 
oligopsony market power is divided by two effects: captive supply market power and cash 
cattle procurement market power. Therefore, the NEIO approach can measure the market 
power of retail market, cash cattle market, and captive supply as a function of concentration. 
Second, the time varying model is applied to look into the dynamic change of market 
conducts such as conjectural variation and market power. Consequently, we can 
dynamically calculate the change of concentration effect on market power and cost 
efficiency in the U.S. beef packing industry. To estimate the simultaneous equations, 
monthly data from 1990 to 2006 are used in the estimation. 18 
 
The empirical results reveal the presence of market power in both the beef retail 
market and the cattle procurement market in the past two decades. The oligopsony market 
power is slightly greater and less stable than oligopoly market power, but the difference in 
magnitude between oligopoly and oligopsony market power is small for the whole sample 
period. Additionally, further increases in concentration would expand market power in both 
oligopoly and oligopsony markets. However, the oligopoly and oligopsony market powers 
are slightly decreased during the sample period even though the concentration is slightly 
increased from 1990 to 2006. This result may be from other market circumstances. The 
increase of captive supply leads to the increase of oligopsony market power, but the market 
power by captive supply is a relatively small portion of the total market power. Therefore, 
we can conjecture that the majority of market power would be caused by concentration 
rather than captive supply. The results also show that the cost efficiency effects from the 
increased concentration in the U.S. beef packing industry are considerably larger than the 
market power effects in the static model, but slightly lager in the dynamic model. This 
result means that the cost efficiency effect outweighs the market power effects. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in the Empirical Estimation (1990.1-
2006.12, N=204) 
Variable  Symbol  Mean  S. D.  Minimum  Maximum 
Herfindahl index for cattle slaughter  H   0.1390  0.0094  0.1118  0.1507 
Cattle slaughter weight (bil./lbs)  Q   3.4674  0.2787  2.8087  4.1485 
Retail price of beef (cent/lb)  P   317.77  48.24  271.00  431.72 
Cash market price (cent/lb)  1 W   73.46  9.00  58.28  105.5 
Captive supply price (cent/lb)  2 W   85.91  5.39  74.62  99.45 
4 firm concentration ratio  CR   67.29  3.33  58.6  71.2 
4 firm captive supply ratio  CATR   28.80  10.04  10.30  52.90 
Retail price of pork (cent/lb)  pork P   243.99  27.08  199.33  289.76 
Whole. price of chicken (cent/lb)  chicken P   37.68  11.99  16.00  66.80 
Per capita income (thousand $)  INCOME   12.40  1.30  10.47  14.61 
Price of calves (cent/lb)  calves P   101.58  20.91  55.40  149.00 
Price of corn ($/bushel)  corn P   2.31  0.45  1.52  4.43 
Price of sorghum ($/bushel)  sorghum P   2.23  0.53  1.41  4.28 
Price of fuel oil #2 ($/gallon)  fuel P   1.25  0.47  0.83  2.65 
Labor productivity (2000=100)  l X Q   100.73  3.11  95.19  109.17 
Price of labor (2000=100)  l v   98.27  7.79  83.50  110.39 
Capital productivity (2000=100)  c X Q   101.45  1.73  99.53  105.59 
Price of capital (2000=100)  c v   94.51  1.72  99.53  105.59 
Material productivity (2000=100)  m X Q   102.68  2.76  98.71  109.87 
Price of material (2000=100)  m v   101.96  9.57  87.62  121.27 
PPI for farm product (1982=100)  PPI  
108.99  8.58  94.30  135.10 
CPI for meat (1982=100)  m CPI   152.57  18.48  126.10  188.50 
CPI for fuel (1982=100)  f CPI   138.22  22.77  109.90  199.00 23 
 
Table 2. Estimates of the Parameters and Conjectural Variation with the Static Model for 
the U.S. Beef Packing Industry by GMM 
Parameter  Variable  Estimate  S. E.  t-Statistic  p-Value 
Conjectural Variation         
   H   -0.6838  0.0305  -22.45  <.0001 
Supply Function         
0    Constant  1.0582  0.0348  30.41  <.0001 
S    1 W   0.0069  0.0004  17.53  <.0001 
1   
corn P   0.0178  0.0105  1.69  0.0922 
2   
sorghum P   -0.0126  0.0044  -2.84  0.0049 
3   
calves P   -0.0057  0.0003  -21.01  <.0001 
4    fuel P   -0.1260  0.0104  -12.12  <.0001 
Demand Equation         
0    Constant  0.4892  0.0355  13.79  <.0001 
r
d    P   -0.0020  0.0001  -25.06  <.0001 
1   
pork P   0.0020  0.0002  9.88  <.0001 
2   
chicken P   -0.0014  0.0002  -8.02  <.0001 
3    INCOME   0.0305  0.0018  30.02  <.0001 
Cost Function         
ll   
2 / 1 ) ( l lv v   -11.9073  0.1787  -66.64  <.0001 
cc   
2 / 1 ) ( c cv v   -10.5866  0.1688  -62.72  <.0001 
mm   
2 / 1 ) ( m mv v   -11.0806  0.1705  -64.98  <.0001 
lc   
2 / 1 ) ( c lv v   6.2723  0.0987  63.57  <.0001 
cm   
2 / 1 ) ( m cv v   4.4186  0.0652  67.82  <.0001 
ml   
2 / 1 ) ( l mv v   7.0132  0.1041  67.39  <.0001 
l    l v   -0.8583  0.0230  -37.27  <.0001 
c    c v   -0.4366  0.0116  -23.75  <.0001 




Table 3. Conjectural Elasticity and Market Power for the U.S. Beef Packing Industry 
Marginal Effects  Estimate  S.E. 
Conjectural Elasticity (
*  )  0.0440  0.0042 
Market Power in Retail Market (
retail L )  0.1041  0.0082 
Market Power in Cash Market (
cash L )  0.0946  0.0110 
Market Power in Captive Supply Market (
captive L )  0.0294  0.0034 
Note: All estimates are statistical significant at the 5% significance level. 25 
 
Table 4. Marginal Effects of Market Concentration on Market Power and Cost Efficiency 
with Static Model for the U.S. Beef Packing Industry from 1990 to 2006 
Oligopoly 
Oligopsony 
Cost Efficiency  Total Effect 
Cash Market  Captive Market 
Estimate  S.E.  Estimate  S.E.  Estimate  S.E.  Estimate  S.E.  Estimate  S.E. 
155.68  12.32  45.91  5.34  14.27  1.66  -446.98  12.27  -231.12  9.82 
Note: All estimates are statistical significant at the 5% significance level. 
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Table 5. Estimates of the Parameters and Conjectural Variation with the Dynamic Model 
for the U.S. Beef Packing Industry by GMM  
Parameter  Variable  Estimate  S. E.  t-Statistic  p-Value 
Conjectural Variation         
0 c   Constant  0.6105  0.0977  6.25  <.0001 
1 c   H   -0.0199  0.0013  -3.54  <.0001 
2 c   CR   0.0002  0.0002  -10.51  0.3835 
Supply Function         
0    Constant  1.0539  0.0436  24.16  <.0001 
S    1 W   0.0068  0.0006  10.98  <.0001 
1   
corn P   0.0223  0.0116  1.92  0.0562 
2   
sorghum P   -0.0127  0.0051  -2.52  0.0125 
3   
calves P   -0.0057  0.0002  -18.96  <.0001 
4    fuel P   -0.1297  0.0112  -11.61  <.0001 
Demand Equation         
0    Constant  0.5050  0.0624  8.09  <.0001 
r
d    P   -0.0021  0.0002  -12.28  <.0001 
1   
pork P   0.0020  0.0003  7.37  <.0001 
2   
chicken P   -0.0014  0.0002  -6.15  <.0001 
3    INCOME   0.0301  0.0013  23.89  <.0001 
Cost Function         
ll   
2 / 1 ) ( l lv v   -21.6736  0.2860  -75.78  <.0001 
cc   
2 / 1 ) ( c cv v   -11.2807  0.1585  -71.15  <.0001 
mm   
2 / 1 ) ( m mv v   -19.5716  0.2675  -73.16  <.0001 
lc   
2 / 1 ) ( c lv v   6.7053  0.0953  70.34  <.0001 
cm   
2 / 1 ) ( m cv v   4.4467  0.0575  77.30  <.0001 
ml   
2 / 1 ) ( l mv v   15.8728  0.2118  74.94  <.0001 
l    l v   -0.6734  0.0266  -25.36  <.0001 
c    c v   -0.0536  0.0114  -4.71  <.0001 




Table 6. Conjectural Elasticity and Market Power for the U.S. Beef Packing Industry from 
1990 to 2006 
Year  Conjectural 
Elasticity 
Market Power 
in Retail Market 
Market Power 
in Cash Market 
Market Power 
in Captive Market 
  Estimate  S.E.  Estimate  S.E.  Estimate  S.E.  Estimate  S.E. 
1990  0.0503  0.0036  0.1131  0.0058  0.1066  0.0142  0.0200  0.0027 
1991  0.0494  0.0038  0.1103  0.0061  0.1040  0.0144  0.0173  0.0024 
1992  0.0472  0.0040  0.1053  0.0068  0.0958  0.0140  0.0180  0.0026 
1993  0.0422  0.0042  0.0945  0.0073  0.0874  0.0139  0.0133  0.0021 
1994  0.0391  0.0043  0.0920  0.0083  0.0891  0.0150  0.0168  0.0028 
1995  0.0399  0.0042  0.0945  0.0081  0.0955  0.0157  0.0193  0.0032 
1996  0.0388  0.0042  0.0973  0.0086  0.1075  0.0179  0.0233  0.0039 
1997  0.0398  0.0042  0.1027  0.0087  0.1001  0.0164  0.0181  0.0030 
1998  0.0353  0.0043  0.0911  0.0094  0.0887  0.0159  0.0186  0.0033 
1999  0.0347  0.0041  0.0865  0.0090  0.0768  0.0133  0.0267  0.0046 
2000  0.0378  0.0040  0.0827  0.0088  0.0714  0.0123  0.0325  0.0056 
2001  0.0351  0.0038  0.0815  0.0080  0.0744  0.0120  0.0409  0.0066 
2002  0.0352  0.0038  0.0835  0.0082  0.0768  0.0122  0.0444  0.0071 
2003  0.0306  0.0042  0.0673  0.0085  0.0597  0.0113  0.0272  0.0052 
2004  0.0303  0.0041  0.0658  0.0081  0.0652  0.0122  0.0259  0.0049 
2005  0.0339  0.0039  0.0743  0.0075  0.0680  0.0116  0.0251  0.0043 
2006  0.0345  0.0038  0.0786  0.0079  0.0697  0.0114  0.0343  0.0056 
Ave.  0.0388  0.0040  0.0906  0.0078  0.0855  0.0136  0.0264  0.0042 
Note: All estimates are statistical significant at the 5% significance level. 
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Table 7. Marginal Effects of Market Concentration on Market Power and Cost Efficiency 




Cost Efficiency  Total Effect 
Cash Market  Captive Market 
Estimate  S.E.  Estimate  S.E.  Estimate  S.E.  Estimate  S.E.  Estimate  S.E. 
1990  218.32  11.18  66.55  8.87  12.51  1.67  -204.84  14.77  92.84  12.68 
1991  199.19  10.91  60.63  8.39  10.08  1.39  -218.81  14.58  51.10  12.52 
1992  171.41  11.05  52.17  7.63    9.08  1.43  -206.69  14.91  26.67  11.94 
1993  147.03  11.28  44.75  7.12  6.79  1.08  -183.58  16.18  14.99  11.57 
1994  129.95  11.65  39.56  6.67  7.43  1.25  -206.75  16.95  -29.41  12.04 
1995  134.82  11.55  41.04  6.76  8.31  1.37  -239.85  18.21  -55.68  12.49 
1996  131.07  11.64  39.90  6.65  8.65  1.44  -257.18  18.76  -77.56  13.44 
1997  136.65  11.50  41.59  6.83  7.52  1.23  -134.03  19.58  51.73  10.50 
1998  116.59  11.97  35.49  6.35  7.44  1.33  -152.30  18.63  7.22  10.07 
1999  116.50  12.06  35.46  6.13  12.30  2.13  -182.61  19.82  -18.34  10.06 
2000  114.11  12.19  34.73  5.96  15.82  2.72  -180.98  19.91  -16.31  10.36 
2001  123.21  12.14  37.50  6.04  20.60  3.32  -195.18  20.83  -13.87  10.60 
2002  124.28  12.16  37.83  6.04  21.88  3.49  -234.62  20.52  -50.63  11.53 
2003    98.71  12.53  30.05  5.68  13.68  2.59  -217.86  21.35  -75.42  11.20 
2004  101.31  12.43  30.84  5.79  12.26  2.30  -196.78  19.90  -52.37  11.64 
2005  119.45  12.01  36.36  6.17  13.41  2.28  -184.05  20.44  -14.82  12.06 
2006  121.05  12.11  36.85  6.05  18.11  2.98  -181.19  21.65  -5.17  12.55 
Ave.  135.57  11.62  41.26  6.61  12.83  2.05  -199.54  18.54  -9.88  11.56 
Note: All estimates are statistical significant at the 5% significance level. 
 